Operation Torch, The Darlan Deal, and Charles de Gaulle: Franco-American Relations, Winter 1942

Caitlin Poling

American Foreign Policy Website

May 1, 2008

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The Basics of Operation Torch

After the surrender of Paris to the Axis powers, roughly 120,000 French troops were left in West and North Africa, and much of the French fleet rested in Atlantic and Mediterranean ports. These forces were seen to be a very useful asset to be obtained by both Allied and Axis forces, of course to achieve different objectives for each in the Mediterranean (Algeria-French Morocco). President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Winston Churchill agreed upon what was to be a “major strategic move” to gain both the territory and the support of the French troops there (Viorst, 1965, 94). The 1942 offensive would take place in French North Africa, to be codenamed “Torch.” According to Roosevelt’s statement on November 7, 1942, Torch was to repel German and Italian invasion of Africa as well as serve to act as a primary step in liberating and restoring France (See full text). In addition, Torch would get the French forces to fight on the side of the Allies, instead of with the Axis forces (Algeria-French Morocco). Roosevelt began planning for Operation Torch despite the fact that both Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Chief of Staff General George Marshall objected (Porch, 2004, 280). Marshall wanted action in France instead of in North Africa in order to threaten Germany more directly and to help relieve pressure on Russia more (Maguire, 1995, 60).

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President Franklin D. Roosevelt

Biography: Franklin D. Roosevelt

Roosevelt’s political reasons for “Torch” were to satisfy Molotov and the Russians by fulfilling his promise to establish a second front by the end of 1942 and to provide a victory to raise American morale (Funk, 1989, 19). Involvement in the Mediterranean was seen as a “strategic investment,” because Great Britain appeared to be very weak after the fall of Tobruk and Winston Churchill appeared to be vulnerable politically within Great Britain as well (Porch, 2004, 280). The apparent weakness of Great Britain would add to the surprise to the Axis powers of launching such an invasion. North Africa was also seen as an important objective because it lay next to Great Britain’s most important battlefields: Libya and Egypt (Maguire, 1995, 56).

The success of Operation Torch relied on the agreement of the French. The French troops numbered 120,000 in North Africa. Counted against the 112,000 American troops to be involved in the initial assault, the American forces would be outnumbered if the French decided to resist the U.S. invasion (Dreuer, 42). While the Arabs did not concern themselves with the European war, an Arab uprising could undermine the operation. Given the situations, the Allies could not govern the Arabs directly and needed to allow current rule to stay in place as to not disturb the delicate balance that lay in place. To avoid Arab uprising, the U.S. realized that the French had to stay in power. Eisenhower, in his memoirs, stated that “we were invading a neutral country to create a friend” (Maguire, 1995, 58).

Roosevelt first wanted an American only operation to invade Casablanca and Oran. When Churchill learned of this, he feared his plans for attack further east would be ruined. Churchill offered a compromise: three landings (instead of the two desired by Roosevelt) and a combined operation, with the control and command given to the Americans (Funk, 1989, 19). Such concessions were made to get the United States involved in Europe. The invasion was planned by the Allies for Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. The U.S. objectives in Operation Torch were to bring U.S. forces into direct contact with Axis troops in the Mediterranean, thus sealing American military commitment to that area in the war. In addition, landing in North Africa would leave the U.S. an opportunity to strike Rommel from behind (Porch, 2004, 291). Operation Torch was intended to force Axis powers in North Africa to two fronts – Tunisia and Egypt – that were 1,500 miles apart; thus forcing Rommel to retreat due to inadequate manpower at each(Porch, 2004, 292). In the end, Torch was comprised of 65,000 Allied troops that were divided into three separate “Assault Forces” in different areas: Algiers, Oran, and Morocco (Porch, 2004, 292). The North African nations involved were, at the time, under the control of the Vichy government of France (Voigt, 95).

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Sir Winston Churchill

Biography: Winston Churchill

American troops on a landing craft at Oran. November, 1942

US and the French: Preparing for Torch

On November 7, 1942 Roosevelt issued a statement to announce the opening of a second front in French North Africa. He stated that the “allies seek no territory and have no intention of interfering with friendly French Authorities in Africa” (see full text). In addition, Roosevelt broadcasted a radio message to the French people in French. In this message, he made clear to the French that the United States had no intention of taking over French territory, but only the intentions of defeating French enemies and liberating France (President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Message to the French People) At the same time, Giraud issued a call to the Frenchmen of North Africa to reiterate the point of Roosevelt. He asked that they rally to the Allied cause (Porch, 2004, 350).

In Lieut. General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Proclamation to the French on November 7, 1942 Eisenhower gave orders to the Frenchmen of North Africa to give signals to avoid misunderstanding. He also gave orders to the naval units, Coast Guard, and aviation units. He reminded the Frenchmen that the United States would not fire first as long as the previous precautions were taken. Eisenhower also conveyed a message from Roosevelt to the Frenchmen of North Africa that was similar in nature to his previous message to the French people that the United States did not wish to conquer the colonies, but to restore the democracy and liberties of the French people. He also reiterated that the Americans would depart as soon as German and Italian forces were driven out of the area.

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Roosevelt issued a statement to Marshal Henri Pétain in which he told Pétain of the reason for the United States’ interest in North Africa. He was well aware that Italy and Germany planned to invade and occupy the French territory of North Africa. This would be seen by the U.S. as a prelude to further conquest of French colonies, including those located in the American Hemisphere. Such conquests would be an obvious and immediate danger to the United States (see full text).In his reply to this message, Pétain claimed that Roosevelt’s reasons for invading North Africa were unjustified. According to Pétain, the U.S. had no reason to believe that Germany and Italy would pursue French colonies in the American Hemisphere. The order that Pétain would give to the French would be to attack the American invaders (see full text).

After the U.S. severed relations with the Vichy Government of France, Roosevelt wanted to ensure that the French who were not in support of Vichy were aware that the U.S. still supported the French people. He did so in President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Statement upon Termination of Diplomatic Relations with the Vichy Government. He stated on November 9, 1942 that “we have not broken relations with the French. We never will.”

In Roosevelt’s message to Admiral Jean Pierre Esteva, who was the resident general at Tunis, President Roosevelt stated the objectives of the United States were to help Tunisia resist Axis forces with the dispatch of American forces. He asked for the cooperation of Esteva and the French forces there to destroy a “common enemy” (see full text).

Allied troops on the beaches of Algiers

The “Darlan Deal”

At the onset of Operation Torch, a group of men that were loyal to the Free French seized the majority of the communications centers of Algiers, including the central post office where control of the telephone and telegraph lines lay (Porch, 2004, 350). In addition, they placed both General Juin and Admiral Darlan under house arrest (Porch, 2004, 350). Unfortunately, the slow advance of the Allied powers into Algiers allowed for this progress to be undone. Juin and Darlan were able to send a message to Vichy France to ask for German air support against the Allied invasion (Porch, 2004, 351).

The Arab and Muslim population of North Africa proved to be bitter towards the allies. As Axis forces arrived in Tunisia during November of 1942 to counter Operation Torch, the Arabs overwhelmed the Axis forces with their demand to join the ranks (Porch, 2004, 24). When landing in North Africa, the U.S. met serious opposition in Morocco and sporadic opposition elsewhere. Darlan, who happened to be in North Africa at the time to visit his polio-stricken son, acted in the name of Pétain and agreed to a cease-fire. This agreement was not an unplanned dealing, but was rather a carefully considered decision, resulting in much controversy. Admiral Darlan was the commander in chief of the Vichy forces in North Africa (Porch, 2004, 358). Darlan was an interesting character. His aim, according to Rossi, “was to emerge on the side of the winner” (Rossi, 1993, 91).

Admiral François Darlan

Biography: Admiral François Darlan

In October of 1942, before the launch of Operation Torch, Darlan told the U.S. that he would join the Allies and bring the French fleet with him, but only if he was made commander-in-chief of the French armed forces in North Africa. With three weeks left until Operation Torch, he upped his demands. He asked to have supreme command of the U.S. expedition to North Africa. This was justified in his mind because only he had the ability to rally the French troops there to the Allied cause (Rossi, 1993, 92). The same offer and claims were made by General Henri Giraud, a Frenchman opposed to the Vichy government. After realizing that the military would not listen to him, Giraud gave way to Darlan (Rossi, 1993, 93). When Giraud arrived in North Africa on November 9, 1942 after the invasion was already underway. He called for an armistice, but he had no effect. Giraud failed to turn the North African French into allies, so the U.S. had two choices. They could negotiate with Darlan, or they could begin a military conquest of North Africa (Maguire, 1995, 64). If North Africa were to be a base after Anglo-American invasion, Roosevelt needed a French Administration that would cooperate. Roosevelt’s policy was to adopt, and not adapt, the current Vichy Administration in North Africa for two reasons. First, for an unopposed invasion. Secondly, to make Darlan the political head of France as part of U.S. policy regarding post-war France and Western Europe that would maintain order (Verrier, 1965, 9).

Working with Darlan would mean excluding de Gaulle from Operation Torch, to de Gaulle’s dismay. American intelligence had evidence that commanders of the French armed forces in North Africa were pro-Vichy and anti-de Gaulle. According to Churchill, this was due to the face that France had experience many political upheavals in her history. The French Resistance movement could be seen as anarchy. While the French army did not like the Germans, they could not go against the lawful chain of command. Maintaining this chain of command was seen as necessary for the self-preservation of the French nation against the dangers of anarchy and chaos (Rossi, 1993, 94). General Catroux stated that the French army, after fighting against fellow Frenchmen – whose only fault was being Gaullist – “had done their duty by obeying Marshal Pétain, to whom they had sworn fidelity…truth was with Pétain and error was called de Gaulle” (Rossi, 1993, 94). The Free French were torn after the U.S. decided to exclude them from Operation Torch. They resented the U.S. for leaving them out, but they also understood that the French in North Africa were loyal to Pétain. Vichy support would decrease opposition to the operation (Rossi, 1993, 94).

American troops landing on a beach near Oran

November 1942

The question of which Frenchman to deal with was addressed on October 17, 1942 at London between Churchill, the War Cabinet, Eisenhower, and Clark. Darlan had the prestige among the French military and administrative skill. He was also seen by the Americans as anti-German, but not Gaullist. A Gaullist would draw the opposition of the pro-Vichy French of North Africa. (Funk, 1989, 20). Darlan was the best choice because he was seen to have legitimacy. He was able to bring the North African Frenchmen to the side of the Allies because represented the legitimate authority of the Vichy government. Once France was completely occupied by the Germans and the Vichy government came to an end, the source of Darlan’s “legitimacy” was gone (Rossi, 1993, 95). However, he claimed still to be acting in the name of Pétain, and the French of North Africa obeyed (Dreuer, 87)

Darlan reached an agreement with the Allied forces for a cease fire on November 10, 1942 in Algeria and Morocco (Franco-British Studies, 71). This agreement came with its pros and cons. Although the Darlan Agreement resulted in a ceasefire that saved Allied lives and served to secure Morocco and Algeria to the Allies, the price was that Darlan, a member of the Vichy authority who was seen as untrustworthy by the U.S. was accepted as head of civil administration and would carry on in exercising authority in North Africa under Pétain (Porch, 2004, 360). It was announced that

“The present senior officers retain their commands, and the political and administrative organizations remain in force” (Porch, 2004, 361).

Darlan would be the man to exercise authority in North Africa, under the name of Pétain.

In addition, this agreement led to an Axis decision to occupy all of France. Vichy was only provided neutrality by Hitler because it kept French North Africa and the French fleet out of war (Porch, 2004, 358). Although France was now completely occupied by the Nazis, Admiral Darlan announced on November 20, 1942 a confirmation of his previous orders to the French in North Africa to continue fighting alongside the Allied forces.

“I confirm to you my previous orders to fight at the side of American and allied forces for defense and liberation of our territories and integral restoration of French Sovereignty. I add-in agreement with American authorities-that the African Army will never be placed in the position of fighting against Frenchmen” (see full text).

The Clark-Darlan Accord was signed on November 22, 1942 to formalize the agreement with Darlan (Maguire, 1995, 65). The “Darlan Deal” served to discredit American policy towards the French and made America’s war aims seem suspect. With the Darlan agreement, French public opinion shifted towards de Gaulle. It served to hasten the movement towards unification of resistance in France and the recognition of de Gaulle as leader (Maguire, 1995, 68).

General Eisenhower, Admiral Darlan,

Maj. Gen. Mark W. Clark, and Mr. Robert Murphy negotiating at Algiers

1942

Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and West Africa were all administered by different ministries of the French government. The Allies needed to unify them under one authority to be able to maintain law and order so that their attempts to chase the Nazis out of Tunisia would not be disturbed. The only Frenchman who had the majority of support from all three ministries was Darlan. Therefore, Eisenhower had to deal with him (Rossi, 1993, 97). Darlan proved to be useful in this regard. During his forty days in power, Darlan managed to organize the administrative, economic, and governmental structures of an area that, before Operation Torch, was completely dependent on the ministries of France (Maguire, 1995, 69). In doing so, Darlan increased the authority of both himself and his friends. But, under the insistence of the Americans, he began to liberalize the regime (Maguire, 1995, 69).

Locals of Oran meet the Americans at the beach

November 1942

Dealing with Darlan was a moral issue for the United States. Roosevelt accepted Eisenhower’s agreement with Darlan and explained himself in a meeting of the Pacific War Council:

“Yesterday…I told the newspapers, off the record, of an old Bulgarian proverb, approved by the Church, which runs something like this: ‘My children, in case of imminent danger it is permitted to walk with the devil until you are safely across the bridge.’ Here we are, walking with the devil. We dislike him very much but it is just one of those things. Eisenhower admittedly took many chances, but apparently it has worked.” (Rossi, 1993, 99)

It was stated that the Darlan Deal must not be a precedent for U.S. foreign relations. The Allies could not compromise their beliefs and moral standards. According to The Economist, making terms

“with the men, Germans, Italians or of whatever country, whose creeds and habits brought war about would be a betrayal of all that has been worked and fought for…the deal with Darlan must be no precedent” (Bell, 1989, 75)

Wendell Wilkie’s criticism of the Darlan Deal reflected this view as well.

Shall we in America be quiet for instance when our leaders, after promising freedom to the French people, put into control over them the very man who has helped to enslave them? Shall we be quiet when we see our government’s long appeasement of Vichy find its logical conclusion in our collaboration with Darlan, Hitler’s tool? (Hurstfield, 1986, 1986, 179)

The Darlan agreement was criticized greatly. It was seen as an opportunistic sellout to Vichy France. Darlan was regarded as tainted, untrustworthy, and as a political liability (Funk, 1989, 20). The press depicted Darlan as anti-British as well as willing and eager to collaborate with the Nazis (Bell, 1989, 72). In a British Home Intelligence Report, it was stated that “Eisenhower had better not trust Darlan further than he can throw a piano” (Bell, 1989, 73).

In order to defuse the anger of the French, Roosevelt invited de Gaulle to Washington to visit him (Porch, 2004, 362). Churchill sent Roosevelt a telegraph on November 17, 1942 that warned him of the public sentiment that was greatly against the Darlan Deal. He stressed that the arrangement could only be “a temporary expedient, justifiable solely by the stress of the battle” (Bell, 1989, 73). Roosevelt then issued the statement that the agreement with Darlan was merely temporary, using Churchill’s exact words. In Roosevelt’s Statement on North African Policy of November 17, 1942 he stated that “The present temporary arrangement in North and West Africa is only a temporary expedient, justified solely by the stress of battle.” He further claimed that “Admiral Darlan's proclamation assisted in making a ‘mopping up’ period unnecessary. Temporary arrangements made with Admiral Darlan apply, without exception, to the current local situation only.” While Roosevelt claimed the arrangement to be short term, his words did not match the series of events that occurred. On November 19, Darlan announced that he was to be recognized as High Commander in North Africa. On November 23, he proclaimed that French West Africa placed itself under his orders. December 2 saw the formation of the Imperial Council by Darlan, and Darlan was now acting as Chief of State (Bell, 1989, 74). The Daily Mirror of London published a cartoon of Darlan “arriving at the Allied headquarters with an invitation for the weekend, but carrying a pile of suitcases. ‘A lot of suitcases for a short stay,’ ran the caption – no more words were needed” (Bell, 1989, 74).

“A lot of suitcases needed for a short stay”

-Cartoon in the Daily Mirror

December 9, 1942

(Bell, 1989, 74)

De Gaulle met with Stark and stated that as a soldier himself, he could understand Eisenhower’s decision to make an agreement with Darlan because it minimized local resistance and proved strategically useful on many other dimensions (Rossi, 1993, 103). However, he stated that Darlan was only staying in power due to U.S. support. The Fighting French, he claimed, were reflective of national opinion. He also requested a meeting with Roosevelt. This meeting was granted for sometime in December, but it was postponed by the assassination of Darlan (Rossi, 1993, 104).

This situation was brought to resolution by the assassination of Darlan on December 24, 1942. Admiral Darlan was assassinated by a Gaullist, Fernand Bonnier de la Chapelle (Maguire, 1995, 71). Conspiracy was suspected in the assassination of Darlan; it was thought that he was not acting alone (Dreuer, 254). Many believed that de Gaulle was behind this assassination because Francois d’Astier paid Bonnier to kill Darlan. Francois d’Astier was de Gaulle’s adjutant (Maguire, 1995, 71). However, there is no clear evidence that de Gaulle ordered the assassination (Maguire, 1995, 72). Bonnier was executed very quickly, only two days after the assassination, so the true motives behind the plot remain a mystery (Dreuer, 254).

Evaluation of Operation Torch

After evaluating many perspectives on the operation, reviews of “Torch” are mixed. Strategically, the landings were a success, but they caused political problems. Due to this Operation, Anglo-American relations with the French started off on the wrong foot – and did not recover; “a great military success was marred by political controversy” (Bell, 1989, 79). Operation Torch is referred to by historian Stephen Ambrose as a “strategic failure” (Porch, 2004, 367). Looking at the logistics, Allied Forces ended up dispersed and unbalanced. They landed too far west to be able to guard against German attack through Spain – an attack that never occurred. Torch also proved to shake the confidence of Eisenhower’s military leadership as well as his political judgment. The issue of French politics was also put into further conflict, thanks to the Darlan agreement, and the Allies found themselves muddled with discord (Porch, 2004, 367).

However, there was believed to be no real alternative for Operation Torch in 1942 (Porch, 2004, 367). Most deem Operation Torch as “a series of wasted opportunities” to the Allies. Apprehensive planning was to blame for allowing the Axis forces to gain an edge on the Allies in the “Race for Tunis” (Porch, 2004, 412). In addition, the Vichy French did not prove resistant to the Axis forces. This, and a list of other shortcomings, gave the Germans the ability to prolong the conflict in North Africa for eight months. During these long eight months, the Allies sustained more than 70,000 casualties (Porch, 2004, 412).

Although regarded as a political failure, the primary objectives of Torch were accomplished (Maguire, 1995, 56). “Torch did not immediately put U.S. troops into contact with Axis forces, but it placed them in proximity of Axis ground troops” (Breuer, 1985, 256). “Torch” also opened the way for significant military and economic aid to the French. The operation re-armed roughly a dozen French divisions and helped to rehabilitate the French fleet (Funk, 1989, 26). As a result of the Darlan Deal, Darlan persuaded Boisson to join the Allies. This would allow for airlifts to French West Africa to bring men, supplies, and planes there by air to later be used in Europe (Funk, 1989, 27). Also, according to Porch, 2004, losing the “Race for Tunis” was beneficial to the Allied cause. Operation Torch provided the Allied forces with a lower-risk setting in which they could hone their fighting skills. In addition, Torch contributed to postponing the invasion of France (Operation Torch: Allied Invasion of North Africa). Had they invaded France at that time, results could have been disastrous due to a lack of practical preparation and fighting skills (Porch, 2004, 412). This delay allowed the U.S. to complete the mobilization of its vast industrial and manpower resources that would prove invaluable in the colossal air and ground battles of 1944. “Torch” was beneficial in that it gave the Allied forces considerable beachheads in North Africa at what was measured to be a relatively modest cost (Algeria-French Morocco). The U.S. suffered 1,404 casualties during Operation Torch. 556 troops were killed, 837 were wounded, and 41 were recorded as missing (Breuer, 1985, 254). The operation also allowed the Allies to open their Mediterranean Sea lines of communication (Operation Torch: Allied Invasion of North Africa).

There were also unforeseen benefits of Operation Torch. The mission helped to foster unity among the Allied forces. It allowed the U.S. and Great Britain to establish an effective and efficient combined joint high command. They were given the opportunity to work together and establish common practices. Even the smallest things that could be overlooked yet provide a potential for miscommunication and error, such as establishing a common language for military operations, were taken care of during Operation Torch (Operation Torch: Allied Invasion of North Africa).

“A great military success was marred by controversy.”

(Bell, 1989, 79)

Allied troops shortly after landing at Algiers

November 1942

Troops inland on Operation Torch

1942

British and American forces near Algiers

November 1942

De Gaulle, the Free French, and Operation Torch

Relations between the U.S. and the French were complicated during Operation Torch due to the fact that France was partially occupied by Germany, the unoccupied zone was ruled by the Vichy government (considered to be in the palms of the Nazis), and the French resistance movement was gaining power and attempting to make a claim for rule and authority in decision making as well. The most notable character among the French resistance was Charles de Gaulle.

As French forces were swiftly overwhelmed and defeated at the beginning of World War II, Charles de Gaulle openly opposed the negotiation of a surrender to Nazi Germany (Breuer, 1985, 32). In the “Appel du 18 juin,” Free France was founded (see full text). The “Appel du 18 juin” was a response to Pétain’s armistice with Germany (Maguire, 1995, 2). In the Brazzaville Manifesto of October 24, 1940, de Gaulle claimed that Vichy meant only enemy control of France. He claimed himself to be the true government of France (Maguire, 1995, 4). This speech shocked both the British and the Americans because de Gaulle claimed himself to be the rightful leader of France without having any constitutional legitimacy. Regarded as guilty of treason by Vichy France, de Gaulle saw himself as the sole enduring man of the legitimate Reynaud government, who should be exercising power in France (Maguire, 1995, 4). De Gaulle was successful in recruiting considerable forces by the end of July of 1940. There were 7,000 people who volunteered to join the forces of the Free French (Breuer, 1985, 83).

Charles de Gaulle was well aware of the upcoming Operation Torch. He acted as though he was indifferent, while believing that the Allies would eventually come to him to lead the French in Operation Torch (Voigt, 105). However, in October of 1942, de Gaulle grew worried. He feared that the United States was seeking another man to assume French leadership. Setting pride aside, de Gaulle wrote a lengthy letter to President Roosevelt, asking for sympathy and the cooperation of the United States with Fighting France. Roosevelt never responded to this letter (Voigt, 105-107).

Behind all of Roosevelt’s dealings with France was his view that France was ‘finished.’ However, France and her empire possessed tremendous assets of great importance to the United States. Roosevelt’s foreign policy with Vichy was based on the assumption that Vichy was “an entity, capable of sustained and concerted political decisions,” that was the legitimate authority of the French people (Verrier, 1965, 14). Roosevelt claimed that his apparent opposition to de Gaulle was because he believed firmly in self-determination.

“…but I have a moral duty that transcends an ‘easy way.’ It is to see to it that the people of France have nothing foisted on them by outside powers…Self-determination is not a word of expediency” (Funk, 1989, 17).

Roosevelt insisted that his opposition of de Gaulle was political, not a personal vendetta. He was willing to recognize de Gaulle as a leader if it was in accord with the voice of the people.

“I am perfectly willing to have de Gaulle made President, or Emperor, or King or anything else so long as the action comes in an untrammeled and unforced way from the French people themselves.” (Funk, 1989, 17).

Roosevelt opposed de Gaulle because he believed it would reintroduce the forces of chaos and disorder in France that had been settled somewhat by the establishment of the Vichy regime. The British and the French had different ideas on the policies concerning the French. Churchill supported de Gaulle while Roosevelt was content with a Vichy-like government in France (Verrier, 1965, 10).

One of the causes for the rift between Roosevelt and de Gaulle lay in their understanding of the role of France in a post-World War II world. Roosevelt saw France to be of no great importance in the post-war world. He could see no use for “French grandeur” or the French Empire in the post-war world (Rossi, 1993, 67). Roosevelt viewed empires to serve only as a source for international chaos and war. He saw the appeal of de Gaulle as vain. In Roosevelt’s opinion, the fate of France was best left to be determined in his hands. De Gaulle, on the other hand, viewed a strong France to be an absolute necessity for world organization (Voigt, 106). The U.S. State Department, as stated by Ray Atherton – chief of the Division of European Affairs, viewed de Gaulle as blind and hopeless (Voigt, 108). The reason for Roosevelt’s decision to lay Torch off-limits to de Gaulle and the forces of the Free French was twofold. First, he could not trust the Free French Forces with intelligence about the mission. He feared that it would be leaked to the Axis powers or to Vichy. Secondly, the mere participation and presence of the Free French in North Africa could invoke a negative reaction from the Vichy supporters living in North Africa (Porch, 2004, 344). In addition, the existence of the harsh feelings of the Vichy army and navy against de Gaulle influenced the U.S. decision to exclude de Gaulle (Maguire, 1995, 61). French grudges against the British and the Free French were also present among the Frenchmen in North Africa, further contributing to the exclusion of de Gaulle (Maguire, 1995, 63).

Charles de Gaulle speaking on BBC radio

June 18, 1940

General Charles de Gaulle

Biography: General Charles de Gaulle

The Croix de Lorraine, the symbol of the Free French (chosen by de Gaulle)

American treatment of de Gaulle began to upset Winston Churchill more and more. Churchill had, after all, previously recognized de Gaulle as the leader of the Free Frenchmen (Voigt, 108). Churchill was de Gaulle’s greatest supporter among the Allied forces. It is easy to understand why Churchill wanted to make it clear to de Gaulle that his mistreatment was the doing of the Americans. Roosevelt cared very little that Churchill placed the blame for the ill-treatment of de Gaulle upon his shoulders (Voigt, 109).

Charles de Gaulle’s inflexible nature led to a poor allied opinion of French performance in Operation Torch (Porch, 2004, 567). However, de Gaulle managed to end up better off after Operation Torch and the Darlan Deal, regardless of his rigid demeanor. Amusingly enough, Roosevelt’s hostility towards de Gaulle only served to benefit the general. Those close to Roosevelt soon began to realize that dealing with Darlan led to an increased support for de Gaulle (Verrier, 1965, 13).The French saw de Gaulle as a leader who would not forfeit French honor and independence to the United States. When de Gaulle stood up to Roosevelt, he served to sooth the wounded pride of the French people (Rossi, 1993, 68).

The death of Darlan finally put an end to America’s Vichy policy, a mere six weeks after the actual end of the regime (Hurstfield, 1986, 1986, 184). After Darlan’s assassination, a replacement was chosen: Giraud (Porch, 2004, 366). A meeting was held in January of 1943 to reach a solution to the “French problem” in Anfa, a suburb of Casablanca (Viorst, 1965,138). Roosevelt insisted upon Giraud. Churchill favored de Gaulle. Roosevelt informed Churchill that he did not wish for de Gaulle to even be present at this forum. After reaching Casablanca Roosevelt reconsidered, and de Gaulle was summoned (Viorst, 1965, 139). Before leaving Casablanca, Roosevelt wanted to appear to have reached some sort of accord between the two generals, de Gaulle and Giraud. Roosevelt asked if the two gentlemen would take a photograph together. This was a trick to create a semblance of French unity (Viorst, 1965, 147). A communiqué was prepared between the two generals at the Anfa meeting. It read:

“We have seen each other. We have discussed. We have affirmed our complete agreement that the goal to be reached is the liberation of France and the triumph of human liberty by the total defeat of the enemy. This goal will be achieved by the union in the war of all Frenchmen fighting side by side with their allies.” (Viorst, 1965, 146)

General Henri Giraud was the most high-ranking military figure of the French Resistance group (Funk, 1989, 19). Despite his groomed and dapper appearance, Giraud did not meet American expectations. Under Giraud, North Africa was described as “Vichy without Pétain” (Hurstfield, 1986, 1986, 185). Liberties were still absent from the people, and Giraud had yet to work to remove the legislation that proved anti-Semitic. According to Eisenhower Giraud was “reactionary, old-fashioned, and cannot be persuaded to modernize…he has no, repeat no, political acumen whatsoever” (Porch, 2004, 366). Despite Giraud’s shortcomings, Roosevelt refused to support de Gaulle as a leader. In the eyes of Roosevelt, de Gaulle did not resemble a liberator but a “power-hungry Latin American general” (Porch, 2004, 366).

Although at Casablanca, Giraud appeared to emerge on top, de Gaulle gained the favorable result in the end. At Casablanca, de Gaulle was able to assert his own independence. He was also able to ‘measure up’ his competitor, Giraud (Viorst, 1965, 147).In 1943, de Gaulle’s effective control over the Free French extended and consolidated in both the realms of politics and military (Hurstfield, 1986, 1986, 184). By November of 1943, roughly a year after the “Darlan Deal,” de Gaulle had emerged as the victor to lead the French people. Giraud was stripped of all political authority (Hurstfield, 1986, 1986, 185). De Gaulle would lead the fight for the freedom of France for the rest of World War II.