Selected
Documents on Japan’s Decision for War, July – October 1941
From The Japanese Monographs (http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/)
Cabinet Planning Board Report, “Resources
Necessary to be Mobilized for the Execution of War,” 29 July 1941
From the time of the outbreak of the China Incident, Japan
has been endeavoring to establish a production structure to insure self-
sustenance. So far, this has proven impossible as Japan,
in the past, depended so heavily upon international economy, particularly
British and American. Further, Japan's
national policy to establish a new order in the Far East
has resulted in hindering diplomatic negotiations with the Netherlands East
Indies in regard to the procurement of oil. The outbreak of the European war
was another important factor in preventing the establishment of a self-supporting
production structure in Japan
by preventing the importation of machinery from Germany
and Italy, or
from Switzerland
through Germany
or Italy, which
is vitally necessary for the production of strategic materials.
During the latter half of last year, Japan endeavored to become
self-supporting within the East Asia Coprosperity
Sphere and increased her stocks of materials by importing from Germany, Italy
and the Soviet Union all essential items possible from those countries, and, as
far as possible, materials from the United States and Great Britain and
countries under their influence, prior to the severance of diplomatic relations
with the United States and Great Britain. However, owing to the condition of Japan's
gold reserve, maritime transportation capacity and storage facilities at that
time, these special imports failed to meet the requirements of Japan's
prospective war effort. Meanwhile, war between Germany
and the Soviet Union prevented further importation of
materials from Germany
and Italy. This
has placed Japan
economically at a great disadvantage.
If Japan desires to maintain her present production power and acquire a
quantity of material equal to that produced during 1940, she must secure
certain vital strategic materials. To do this, it would be necessary to import
large quantities of materials from countries outside Japan's
self-supporting sphere [1] and her first sphere of supply [2]. It must also be
borne in mind that Japan
has always depended on areas under the influence of Great
Britain and the United
States for these strategic materials. This
must be given careful consideration when Imperial General Headquarters draws up
its plan for war. Japan
must be fully prepared to face this grave situation in the event of a complete
severance of economic relations with Great
Britain and the United
States.
In other words, Japan's materials war potential must depend upon the
productive power of the self-supporting sphere and the first sphere of supply
with the existing stock, and, in the future, upon the increase in productive
power by utilizing operational gains. This is a basic factor in Japan's
decision when considering the type of war to be executed.
It is, therefore, absolutely essential that Japan obtain operational results
within the shortest possible time, in view of her limited strength, and that
she must secure new sources of materials by utilizing operational gains before
her stocks are exhausted.
In the past, when there were possibilities of peace between belligerent
countries upon the achievement of success in certain operations, wars could be
successful when the country already had stockpiles of certain materials, but in
modern warfare, final victory can only be attained by a country prepared to
fight a protracted war on the strength of its self-supporting productive
capacity.
An examination of the relation between stockpiles of strategically important
materials of the Japanese Empire under the control of the Japanese Government
and civilian authorities (not including material) already distributed to the Armed
Forces) and the amounts required for operational purposes showed that it would
be necessary to produce or obtain fresh supplies of important materials within
the following period:
Nickel and nickel ore ................. about two months
Manganese ore ......................... about four months
Pitch-cokes ........................... about four months
Manila hemp ........................... about one month
First-class crude oil ................. about four months
Second-class crude oil ................ about six months
Aviation gasoline ..................... about one to five months
Ordinary gasoline ..................... about two months and a half
Heavy oil ............................. about one month and a half
Ordinary machine oil .................. about two months and a half
Light oil ............................. about 10 days
Kerosene .............................. about three months
Semisolid lubricating oil ............. about three months
Castor oil ............................ about six months
In other words, should Great Britain, the United States and the Netherlands
East Indies, as well as other islands in the South Pacific and the South
American nations, sever economic relations with Japan, it would be necessary to
obtain these materials by force of arms within the specified periods. This
point would have to be carefully considered in carrying out operations.
Moreover, immediately after entering into a state of war with Great Britain and
the United States, materials which had been imported from such countries as
South America and India, such as cobalt, cobalt ore, platinum ore, lead and
lead ore, quicksilver, high-class asbestos, high-class mica and tannin, which
it would be impossible to obtain from either the "sphere of self-sufficiency"
or the "first supply sphere" would have to be supplied from stock. As
the quantity of these materials in stock is so limited that it would soon be
exhausted, every possible effort must be made to produce substitutes. A review
of the present state of our industry shows little hope of a rapid increase in
production of such substitutes; therefore, it will be necessary to drastically
control and economize on the consumption of products made from these materials,
as well as in the use of these materials themselves.
In regard to maritime transport capacity, which constitutes a bottleneck in
productive capacity, unless the absolute command of the sea and air bases in
the Southern area is secured immediately our shipping losses will exceed our
shipbuilding capacity. This would affect the over-all productivity of the
country. Therefore, every effort must be made to destroy enemy naval and air
bases as quickly as possible.
[1] Japan's
"self-supporting sphere" covered Japan,
Manchuria and occupied China.
[2] The "first sphere of supply" signified the area Japan
anticipated occupying during the initial stage of the war and included the Philippines,
Borneo, Netherlands
East Indies, Malaya, French
Indo-China and Thailand.
Explanation by Chief of Naval
General Staff Nagano at the Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941
The Prime Minister has just given a generalized explanation, stating that
the Empire should concentrate her efforts on surmounting the present crisis by
peaceful ways und means in order to insure the Empire's future development and stability.
From the operational standpoint of Imperial General Headquarters, based on the
assumption that a peaceful solution has not been found and war is inevitable,
the Empire's oil supply, as well as the stockpiles of many other important war
materials, is being depleted day by day with the result that the national
defense power is gradually diminishing. If this deplorable situation is left
unchecked, I believe that, after a lapse of some time, the nation's vitality
will deteriorate and ultimately fall into dire straits. On the other hand, the
defense of military installations and key points of Britain,
the United States
and other countries in the Far East, as well as military
preparations of these nations, particularly those of the United
States, are being strengthened and augmented
at a fantastic tempo. By the latter half of next year, military preparations of
the United States
will have made such rapid strides that we will find it difficult to oppose
them. Therefore, wasting time now can prove disastrous for the Empire. Such
being the case, if our minimum demands for the Empire's self-existence and
self-defense are not recognized in diplomatic negotiations and if ultimately a
war becomes inevitable, I believe that it is imperative for the Empire that it
should first make the fullest preparations and lose no time in carrying out
positive operations with firm determination, in order that it can find a way
out of the difficult situation.
In regard to the prospect of war, we can perceive a strong possibility that
the opponent will carry on a prolonged war. Therefore, the Empire must resolve
and prepare for it. If the opponent should attempt a short and decisive action
and challenge us by advancing with the main force of its naval strength, it
would be a desirable situation. At this time, when the European war is still
being fought, the naval strength which Britain
can afford to dispatch to the Far East will be subjected
to considerable restriction. Therefore, in case we intercept the combined
Anglo-American Fleet on our anticipated area of decisive battle, I am confident
that the chances are in our favor if we take into account full utilization of
land based aircraft. However, even when the Empire gains a victory in this
decisive battle, such a victory alone would not end the war. In all
probability, the opponent will then switch to a prolonged war based on the
strength of his superiority in industrial power and resources.
Our Empire has not means by which to subjugate the enemy by invasion
operations or to break his will to fight. Moreover, a long war is what we least
desire because of the meagerness of our domestic resources. However, if we
should enter into a long war, the first requisite for enduring it is to
promptly occupy, at the outset, the enemy's strategic points and areas rich in
natural resources, complete a solid operational setup and, at the same time,
acquire from our sphere of influence vitally needed matarials.
If this first-stage operation should be accomplished promptly, the Empire then
will be in a position to secure strategic points in the Southwest Pacific, even
if military preparations of the United States
develop as scheduled, and we shall be able to establish the foundation for a
long war by maintaining an invincible position. It is my belief that the course
of events thereafter will be mostly determined by the nation's total strength
and the development of the world situation.
Thus, success or failure of the first-stage operations will have a
tremendous bearing on the outcome of the war. However, the prerequisites for
augmenting the probabilities of success in the first-stage operations are,
first, to decide upon the declaration of war promptly while considering the
actual war potential of both sides; secondly, to take the initiative without
being circumvented by the opponent; and thirdly, to take into consideration the
weather conditions in the theater of operations from the viewpoint of
facilitating operations.
Based upon the aforementioned considerations, we have set the time for vital
decision as given in this plan.
Needless to say, we intend to push preparations for military operations
prudently, taking into full account the developments of diplomatic
negotiations. I would like to add one more word. We must seek with utmost
efforts the way by which we can surmount the present crisis peacefully and
insure the development and stability of the Empire. We must avoid any war which
can be avoided. But at the same time, for the future interest of our Empire we
must not be forced into a position where we would have to fight under extremely
disadvantageous conditions.
My views on the aspect of military preparations, as given in my explanation
herein, have been prepared solely on the assumption that war cannot be avoided.
Explanation by Chief of Army
General Staff Sugiyama at the Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941
The Army Section wholly agrees with the explanation given by the Chief of
Naval General Staff. Therefore, I will confine my explanation mainly to the
relationship between preparations for war and diplomatic negotiations.
Is evidenced by the previous explanation delivered by Premier Konoye and in view of the present urgent situation,
especially of the gradual decrease in the potentiality of our national strength,
it is my firm conviction that the time has come for the Empire to decide on
peace or war. Furthermore, it has become imperative for Imperial General
Headquarters to make immediate and necessary preparations for military
operations to cope with both peace and war.
If we should play into the hands of the United
States and Great
Britain by being driven into the prolonging
of diplomatic negotiations at a time when the situation is urgent, the
potentiality of the Empire's national defense strength would gradually decrease
while at the same time the armament of the United
States, and Britain
would gradually increase. Such a situation would make our military operations
more difficult and place us in a position where we would be forced to lose the
advantage of surmounting the obstacles created by the United
States and Britain.
Therefore, we must open hostilities against the United
States and Britain
while we have confidence in waging war against them. Thus, after considering
the meteorological conditions in the anticipated theater of operations, we have
decided that the appropriate time for the completion of war preparations is the
middle of October.
Furthermore, the Empire at this time should take final diplomatic action to
determine peace or war. Until such time, the Imperial General Headquarters must
take such precautions regarding the execution of the preparations for military
operations as to ensure its actions will not arouse the United
States and Britain
and as the result place us in a disadvantageous position in our diplomatic
negotiations.
However, in case we are unable to attain our diplomatic aims, we must
immediately decide to declare war on the United
States and Britain
and hasten the preparations for war. Preparations must be completed by the
middle of October, including the dispatch of reinforcements to southern French
Indo-China. Our determination as to whether or not to open hostilities should
be established by early October at the latest in consideration of the viewpoint
of troop movements.
As for the northern area, I believe that we do not have to worry about any
contingencies in that theater during our southern operations inasmuch as the
preparations for anti-Soviet operations which the Empire has been conducting
since the outbreak of the German-Soviet war are already being further
strengthened and accelerated.
I believe that the ultimate coalition between the United
States and the Soviet Union
is natural, but due to climatic restrictions large-scale operations in the
north during winter are very difficult. Moreover, even if the United
States and the Soviet Union
should join together and launch military movements from some of their aircraft
and submarines, the possibility of full-scale operations is very small.
Therefore, I believe that we would be able to cope with any change of situation
in the north after next spring if we succeed in bringing a speedy end to the
operations in the south. On the other hand, if we should lose this seasonably
favorable opportunity, it would be quite difficult later to secure
impregnability in the north, while carrying on military operations in the
south.
In conclusion, I want to emphasize that if the situation should result in a war
in the south, the Empire should immediately disclose her intention to Germany
and Italy and
tighten the agreement with those two countries so that Japan,
Germany and Italy
can cooperate closely to achieve the common objectives of the war. The most
important item in the direction of war is to prevent Germany
and Italy from
concluding a separate peace with the United
States and Britain.
Explanation by President of
the Planning Board Suzuki at the Imperial Conference of 5 September 1941
I wish to offer my explanation on the potentiality of the national power of
our Empire. In my opinion we do not have to worry about the moral strength of
the nation or the manpower which constitutes the source of our national
strength regardless of any situation which may confront us in the future. Our
main problem is maintaining stockpiles of materials.
From the first our national economy has been founded and developed on trade
with the United States,
Britain and
with countries within the sphere of British influence. Thus, we have been
relying on supplies from abroad for most of the critical materials.
To cope with the worst situation, which it is realized will come sooner or
later, I have been trying, since the outbreak of the China Incident, to have
the economy of this country reject its dependence upon the overseas sources by
planning the exploitation of resources and the development as well as the
boosting of productive power, within the self-sustaining sphere. However, as a
result of the rapid change in the world situation since the outbreak of the war
in Europe, especially of the aggravation of the relationship between Japan and
the United States since last summer, it is expected that, despite the fact that
the development and boosting of the productive power of this country has not reached
a sufficient level, we shall have to be fully prepared to rapidly from
ourselves of economic dependence on the United States and Britain.
For this reason, critical materials have been purchased amounting to
660,000,000 yen since the latter part of last year. It the same time, we have
tried to supplement the deficiency by taking advantage of our relations with Germany
and the Soviet Union. The outbreak of war between Germany
and the Soviet Union this June, however, forced us to
abandon this line of action. Accordingly, the material potentiality of the
Empire's national strength has been forced to depend entirely upon her own
productive power and that of Manchuria, China,
French Indo-China and Thailand,
which are under the influence of our armed forces, and also upon the already
accumulated critical materials.
Consequently, under the present situation of total economic rupture with the
United States
and Britain,
the potentiality of our national strength will be weakened day by day. The
reserve of liquid fuel, which is a matter of importance, will be depleted by
next June or July, regardless of the strict wartime restrictions which may be
imposed on civilian demands. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary for the
self-existence of the Empire to make a definite decision and establish and
stabilize a firm economic foundation.
If the establishment of such an economic foundation must be executed by
military strength, our national productivity is expected to decline for the
time being to about one-half of the present productivity due to surface transportation
capacity and other causes. Consequently, from the point of view of materials, I
think utmost efforts must be made to shorten the period of productive
declination and, at the same time, plane must be drawn up immediately to
exploit the successes gained from military achievements.
If the strategic points in the Southern area can be secured by us in three
or four months, it is estimated that we would be able to acquire some supplies
of petroleum, aluminum ore, nickel, raw rubber and tin in about six months or
thereabouts and utilize them fully after two years. However, since those plans
depend upon military successes, there might be some occasions when things would
not develop as expected. Therefore, we have been conducting research on means to
cope with such a situation.
High octane gas, cobalt and a few other critical materials may be difficult
to obtain even though the Southern area is occupied, but they will not
constitute a great obstacle to the maintenance and strengthening of national
strength since research has already been undertaken on the production of their
substitutes and since strict restriction has been enforced on their
consumption.
Conclusions Reached After Study of "The
Outline for the Execution of the Empire's National Policy," at the Liaison
Conference from 23 to 30 October 1941
1. What is the outlook of the European war situation? (Studied by the
Foreign Ministry and the Supreme Command)
Conclusion: At the present time there appears to be little
possibility of peace being concluded between Germany
and Great Britain,
or Germany and
the Soviet Union, and, in all probability, the war will
become protracted. However, since Germany
does desire peace, peace is not impossible, but much will depend on the war
situation and the attitude of Great Britain
and the Soviet Union.
Explanation: The German forces have already approached the outskirts
of Moscow and the Soviet field
armies in the European USSR have suffered a severe blow; therefore, the
German-Soviet war should end in victory for Germany.
However, the Stalin regime, fully aware that capitulation to Germany would lead
to the collapse of its administration, will continue passive resistance,
depending upon its political power, which has now been consolidated, and upon
the resources east of Voltsk, which are regarded as
inadequate. It will also depend upon aid from the United
States and Great
Britain. Therefore, in view of the fact that
the German-Soviet war is now assuming the aspects of a racial war, the Soviet
will continue to resist.
German leaders state that communism must be overthrown completely and that
the present war against the Soviet Union will be
meaningless unless the Soviet Union is dealt a fatal
blow, rendering it impossible for it to counterattack. It would seem, under
these circumstances, that Germany
will not make peace with the Soviet Union on lenient
terms.
Great Britain's
national character is steeped in the tradition and pride of a great nation. In
restoring her national defense potential by taking advantage of the
German-Soviet war, she will have considerable confidence in her capacity to
prosecute a war and will not yield readily to Germany.
Consequently, the Anglo-German war is expected to be a long one.
However, Germany
having already secured the rich Ukraine,
will seize the oil fields in the Caucasus in the near
future and will then advance and capture the Near East
and Suez. Thus, by controlling the European
Continent and establishing an invincible position, Germany
will be able to complete the first phase of a new order in Europe.
Under the circumstances, it will not be necessary for Germany
to further expand its territory or to crush Great
Britain.
If Germany
launches an invasion of the British homeland, and succeeds in the landing
operation, or if its counter-blockade of Great
Britain proves effective, it will be a
staggering blow to Great Britain,
and this, coupled with the decline of the Soviet power, will possibly bring
peace to Europe.
German troops may be able to land in Great
Britain, but, in view of the great dangers
involved, in all probability this will not be attempted until early next
spring. Some assert that if Germany
succeeds in landing on the British Isles, the British
Fleet will flee to the Pacific. In view of the German announcement that it will
not assume the responsibility of feeding the British people, it is unthinkable
that from a humanitarian point of view, the British Fleet would take such an
action, leaving 47 million fellow countrymen to their fate.
2. What is the operational outlook of a war against the United
States, Great
Britain and the Netherlands
in its initial stage and in subsequent years?
What military measures would be taken by the United
States and Great
Britain to utilize unoccupied areas in China?
(Studied by the Supreme Command).
Conclusion:
a. Army Operations: Despite foreseeing considerable difficulty in
operations-against the southern area in the initial phase, the Japanese Army is
fully confident of success. Thereafter, with the maintenance of surface traffic
by the Navy, the Army will be able to secure the areas required.
b. Navy Operations: The Japanese Navy is confident of victory in its initial
operations and the subsequent interception operations to be executed with the
present ratio of the Navy's strength. With the success of the initial
operations, Japan
will be able to secure strategic areas in the Southwest Pacific and take up
positions from which protracted operations can be carried out. Since in
operations against the United States
it is not possible to carry out decisive military actions to bring the enemy to
submission, Japan
must be prepared for a long war. Japan's
success or failure in such a war will depend on her capacity to maintain
adequately her naval strength to cope with the United
States expansion of armament. Therefore, the
war situation will be determined, in the main, by Japan's
total national potential and changes in the international situation.
c. The United States
and Great Britain
will use unoccupied areas in China
mainly for building air bases. In view of the existing situation and the
planned disruption of communication by future Japanese southern operations,
these bases should prove of little concern to Japan.
Also, the enemy's military use of the Chinese coast will not be possible
because of the Japanese Navy's dominance of the Southern sea area.
3. Assuming that hostilities are opened in the southern area this fall, what
effect would this have on the north? (Studied by the War, Navy and Foreign
Ministries, and the Supreme Command)
Conclusion: There is little probability of the Soviet
Union taking aggressive action against Japan
at the outbreak of war in the southern area, but it is possible that the United
States will take, by force, if necessary,
Soviet territory in the Far East to be used as military
bases. At the same time, the Soviet Union will attempt
various maneuvers against Japan,
for which Japan
should be prepared. There is also a possibility of war between Japan
and the Soviet Union, depending upon subsequent
conditions.
Explanation: At the present time, the Soviet Union
retains only 25 per cent of its munitions industry, having lost the area west
of the Volga River.
The Red Army in Europe has suffered a severe setback in
the German-Soviet war and, in order to reinforce it, the Red Army in the Far
East has had to send more than 11 divisions, at least 1,000 tanks
and more than 1,200 planes since the spring. Therefore, the over-all fighting
power of the Red Army is gradually decreasing and the Army in the Far
East has become the last reserve force remaining to the Stalin
regime.
If Japan
launches its southward advance the Anglo-Soviet Military Alliance would be
extended to the Far East, cooperation between the United
States and the Soviet would be accelerated
and Great Britain
and the United States
would force the Soviet Union to take the offensive
against Japan.
It is felt, however, that as long as our Kwantung
Army exists, the Soviet Union will not attempt an
invasion but rather will seek to keep Japan
in check by subversive activities and ideological propaganda, by employing
communists in Manchuria and China.
The United States
will demand that the Soviet Union execute coordinated
operations against Japan
from the north and forcibly use part of her territory in the Far
East as air or submarine bases to attack Japan.
The Soviet Union will find it difficult to reject the United
States' demand and probably will engage in
operations against Japan
with elements of her submarine or air force. Depending upon the situation, this
may lead to war between Japan
and the Soviet Union [1]. In case the Japanese
occupation of the southern area is delayed or the internal conditions of the Soviet
Union become more stable, there is a possibility that the Red army
in the Far East may gradually assume the offensive.
On 13 April 1941, with
the signing of the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Pact, the Soviet Government had
agreed to maintain peace and friendly relations and to respect the integrity of
Japan; not to
conclude any military alliance against Japan
and not to grant military bases to any third power in the Far East.
However, these guarantees may be regarded as Soviet diplomatic policy to cope
with the war against Germany
and, if Japan
starts her southward advance, the situation may assume an entirely different
aspect. It is doubtful that the Soviet Union would
adhere to the Japan-Soviet
Neutrality Pact should Japan
commences her southern operations and withdraw troops from the north.
[….]
7. In regard to hostilities against the United
States, Great
Britain and the Netherlands,
what kind and amount of cooperation will Germany
and Italy
pledge to Japan? (Studied by Foreign, War and Navy
Ministries.)
Conclusion: In the event of the outbreak of hostilities between Japan,
the United States,
Great Britain
and the Netherlands,
presumably little help can be effected from either Germany
or Italy.
However, if Japan
informs them of her intention to go to war and proposes an operational
agreement, she will be able to obtain their promises generally to the following:
a. A declaration of war against the United
States.
b. Separate treaties will not be concluded by Japan,
Germany or Italy
with either the United States and Great Britain,
or with Great Britain
alone.
c. Germany
and Italy will
cooperate with Japan
by taking positive action in the Near East.
d. Germany
and Italy will
cooperate in the execution of warfare to destroy commerce.
Explanation: Germany
and Italy would
be pleased to see the Japanese Empire go to war against the United
States, Great
Britain and the Netherlands.
However, even if Germany
and Italy agree
to assist Japan,
the help will be slight as the sphere of such coordinated operational actions
would be relatively small.
The Japanese Empire would require the assurance of Germany and Italy that
they would divert the fighting power of the United States to the Atlantic
insofar as possible by declaring war against the United States and that they
would at no time conclude a separate peace with the United States and/or Great
Britain. In view of the present relationship between the United
States and Germany
and the fact that Chancellor Hitler is planning to take offensive action
against Great Britain,
it is impossible to believe that Germany
and Italy would
refuse to give the required assurances.
It is possible to conclude an agreement on such coordinated operational
actions as can be carried out within limited assigned tasks. Germany,
in all probability, will carry out operations in the Near East
in regard to the German-Soviet War. Therefore, it will be possible for Germany
to cooperate with Japan
by carrying out operations in the Near East
simultaneously with Japan's
southern area operations. Coordinated action to destroy commerce, mainly in the
Pacific and Indian Oceans,
will automatically be carried out.
8. Is it possible to limit the war to the Netherlands
alone or to Great Britain
and the Netherlands?
(Studied by the Foreign Ministry and Imperial General
Headquarters.)
Conclusion: Because of the close relationship between the United
States and Great
Britain and their interest in the Netherlands,
it would be impossible to limit the war to the Netherlands
or to Great Britain
and the Netherlands.
Explanation: The reasons for the conclusion from the standpoint of
political strategy are:
Undoubtedly, an understanding exists between Great
Britain, the United
States and the Netherlands
to stand united in the event of an armed invasion of the southern area by Japan.
Although the actions taken by the United States and Great Britain may be somewhat
different, depending upon the time and method of armed invasion of the southern
area by Japan, the international situation at that time and the domestic
situations of tine United States and Great Britain, the limitation of the
adversary to the Netherlands, or to Great Britain and Netherlands, would be
absolutely impossible. The estimate of the stands to be taken by the United
States and Great
Britain, based on the present situation,
are:
In the event of an armed invasion of the Netherlands East Indies by Japan,
Great Britain
in view of her economic stand, undoubtedly would resist the Japanese forces and
would immediately seek the assistance of the United
States. Even though the United
States might not actively enter the war
immediately, she would resort to feints in order to gain time to reinforce her
military strength. Contrary to the steps taken against Germany,
the United States
will enter a war against Japan
as early as possible. The reasons for this are:
a. The United States
considers that she has a voice in the southwest Pacific area.
b. The United States
needs such raw materials as rubber and tin from this area.
c. Military action by Japan
would menace the Philippines.
d. The United States
would completely lose her voice in Chinese affairs if she did not enter the
Pacific war.
e. United States'
public opinion would be much more likely to favor defense of the Pacific than
of Europe.
The reasons from the standpoint of operations are:
a. Any attempt to carry out operations against the
Netherlands East Indies alone or against the Netherlands
and Great Britain
without taking into consideration the attitude of the United
States, would result in the creation of a
situation whereby we would expose our flank to attack from Singapore,
Hongkong and the Philippines.
b. Under the present circumstances, it would be
extremely difficult to carry out operations against Great
Britain and the United
States if Japan
did not have the initiative. If war against Great
Britain and the United
States was launched after the commencement
of hostilities against the Netherlands,
it would be impossible for Japan
to retain the initiative in view of the present ratio of military strength
between the United States,
Great Britain
and Japan. The
necessity to launch the initial attacks becomes even more urgent when the rapid
increase in the military strength of Great
Britain and the United
States is taken into consideration.
c. It would be impossible to establish a strong strategical position without securing Malaya
and the Philippines.
9. The following conclusions were arrived at on the assumption that war will
break out about March of next year:
a. Advantages and disadvantages from the standpoint
of foreign relations. (Studied by Navy, Foreign and War Ministries and Imperial
General Headquarters)
Conclusion: In view of the present
international position, it would be to Japan's
advantage to commence hostilities about March next year.
Explanation:
(1) In Europe, the Soviet
troops have received a near fatal blow, and, as a result, the Soviet will be
busy regrouping its military strength during this winter and until next spring.. Therefore, it can be estimated that it will be necessary
to transfer a considerable number of the Soviet troops stationed in the Far
East to Europe. This, together with the
increasing internal strife in Soviet Russia, will considerably weaken her
strength in the East. With the commencement of hostilities between Japan
and the United States,
however, Russia
will cooperate with the United States.
(2) Whatever situations may develop, there should
always be opportunities through diplomatic channels, mainly with the Soviet, to
attempt to mediate peace between the Soviet Union and Germany.
(3) Since the winter operations of the German Army
are expected to be carried out mainly against Africa,
the Near East and Central Asia, Great
Britain will be called upon to defend these
areas. At the same time, Great Britain
must prepare for anticipated landing operations by German. forces
against the mainland of Great Britain.
In consequence, Britain's
position in East Asia will be weakened.
(4) Even if the United
States does not enter the war until next
March, she can be expected to assume a stronger military position. Therefore,
the possibility exists that the United States will meet with difficulties in
her domestic administration and be faced with new economic problems as well as
being forced to split her military strength between the European and Pacific theaters.
(5) By March of next year Japan
will be forced to face new economic situations.
(6) From the military point of view, the delay in
the commencement of operations will allow hostile countries to build up their
military strength.
(7) Delay will allow the United
States, Great
Britain, the Netherlands
and China to
strengthen their economic, political and military unity.
[….]
c. Advantages and disadvantages in military
operations. (Studied by Imperial General Headquarters.)
Conclusion: From the operational standpoint,
it would place Japan
at a great disadvantage to delay the outbreak of war until March of next year
and would make aggressive operations absolutely impossible.
Explanation: As time passes, the ratio of
military strength between Japan
and the United States
will be more and more to Japan's
disadvantage. This will be especially true in regard to air strength. The United
States will continue to strengthen the
defense of the Philippines
and the relationship between the United States,
Great Britain,
the Netherlands
and China in
regard to joint defense will be consolidated. Their defensive strength in the
southern area will be built up rapidly.
The total air strength in the Philippines,
Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies has been built up
a little over 10 per cent in the past two months. If diplomatic relations
between these countries and Japan
deteriorate, the rate of reinforcement will be stepped up sharply. Five air
bases in the Philippines
and six in Malaya, now under construction, should be
completed early in the new year.
The Army strength in the Philippines
and Malaya is being reinforced at the rate of
approximately 4,000 men a month.
By spring of next year, Soviet operations in the
northern area would be simpler and there is an increasing possibility that Japan
will be called upon to fight in the north and south simultaneously.
d. In consideration of the above, when should the
war be started? (Studied by the
Army, Navy and Foreign Ministries and Imperial General Headquarters.)
Conclusion: In consideration of the above,
the time for the commencement of hostilities should be set during early
December at the latest.
10. Is there any prospect that our minimum demands, decided at the Imperial
Conference on 6 September, can be attained in a short period of time by
continuing negotiations with the United States.
(Studied by the Foreign, War and Navy Ministries and Imperial Headquarters.)
Conclusion: There is no hope of attaining our demands within a short
period of time.
Explanation: In view of the previous proposals of the United
States authorities, we believe that the United
States is attempting to prolong negotiations
under the pretext of adjusting diplomatic relations in order to avoid conflict
with Japan
until her military preparations are completed. At the sane time, the United
States doubts that Japan
is sincere in her intention to carry out her foreign policy by peaceful means.
The United States still stands by the four general principles for peace
presented on 3 September 1941 (Monograph 14?) and, in consequence, does not
intended to approve diplomatic negotiations until Japanese troops are withdrawn
from China and French Indo-China.
Therefore, there appears to be no hope of attaining our demands, as set
forth at the Imperial Conference of 6 September, within a short period of time.
11. What influence will a war against the United
States, Great
Britain and the Netherlands
exert upon the Chungking
regime? (Studied by the Foreign, War and Navy Ministries.)
Commencement of hostilities by Japan
against the United States,
Great Britain
and the Netherlands
will strengthen Chiang Kai-Shek's resolution to carry
out a protracted war of resistance against Japan,
as well as boost the morale of his troops because of the assistance the United
States and Great
Britain will necessarily accord him.
If such bases as Shanghai and Hongkong, through
which help is given to Chiang Kai-shek, were captured; transport by the Burma
route were interrupted by the southern advance of the Japanese Armed Forces,
and operational results in the southern area were maintained, aid to Chiang
Kai-shek by the Chinese residents in the southern area would be cut off. This would
aggravate the economic pressure being brought to bear on the Chiang regime as
well as affect the actual fighting strength of Chiang's troops. This would, in
turn, affect the morale of the leaders of the Chiang regime and vacillating
officers would more readily sell their allegiance to the Nanking government, thereby further
undermining the strength of Chiang's regime.
[1] Japan did not consider Soviet help to the United States in the form of a
very small number of submarines and the use of airfields as an overt act of
war, but rather as assistance given under pressure because the Soviet Union badly
needed United States' aid in Europe.